Active Labour Market Policy in East Germany: Waiting for the Economy to Take Off by Michael Lechner & Conny Wunsch
 













  Active Labour Market Policy  
in East Germany:  
Waiting for the Economy to Take Off  
   
  Michael Lechner and Conny Wunsch 
  




Editor:  Prof. Jörg Baumberger 
University of St. Gallen 
Department of Economics 
Bodanstr. 1 
CH-9000 St. Gallen 
Phone  +41 71 224 22 41 









Department of Economics 
University of St. Gallen 
Bodanstrasse 8 
CH-9000 St. Gallen 
Phone  +41 71 224 23 25 






















Active Labour Market Policy in East Germany: 


















Author’s address:  Professor Dr. Michael Lechner, Conny Wunsch  
SIAW-HSG 
Bodanstrasse 8 
9000  St. Gallen  
Tel.   +41 71 224 23 50 
Fax  +41 71 224 22 98 
Email michael.lechner@unisg.ch/conny.wunsch@unisg.ch   
Website www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner   
 
Abstract 
We investigate the effects of the most important East German active labour market 
programmes on the labour market outcomes of their participants. The analysis is based on a 
large and informative individual database coming from administrative data sources. Using 
matching methods, we find that over a horizon of 2.5 years after programme start the 
programmes fail to increase the employment chances of their participants in the regular 
labour market. However, the programmes may have other effects for their participants that 
may be considered important in the especially difficult situation experienced in the East 
German labour market. 
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 1  Introduction
* 
Over the last decade, Germany spent more than 7 billion EUR per year on active labour mar 
ket policies (ALMP) to combat the large and persistent unemployment problem in East Ger 
many. In this paper, we investigate the effects of the most important parts of these policies on 
the labour market outcomes of their participants. The analysis is based on a large and infor 
mative individual database coming from administrative data sources and employs economet 
ric matching methods. Concentrating on programmes that start between 2000 and 2002, we 
find that over a horizon of 2.5 years the programmes fail to increase the employment chances 
of their participants in the regular labour market. However, the programmes may have other 
effects, like keeping their participants occupied, that may, or may not, be worthwhile having 
in the special situation of the East German economy. 
Although German Unification happened not too long ago, there is already a considerable lit 
erature about the effects of training and subsidised non market jobs in East Germany, with 
mixed evidence though. Over time, the data quality of the studies increased considerably. The 
earlier studies for East Germany use survey data. These data are rather limited with respect to 
the length of the observation period, sample size and the availability of sufficiently detailed 
information to account for selectivity and programme heterogeneity.
1 Most of these studies 
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1   Pannenberg  (1995),  Steiner  and  Kraus  (1995),  Pannenberg  and  Helberger  (1997),  Fitzenberger  and  Prey 
(1998, 2000), Hübler (1997, 1998), Staat (1997), Kraus, Puhani and Steiner (1999, 2000), Lechner (1999, 
2000), Prey (1999), Hujer and Wellner (2000), Eichler and Lechner (2002), Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    1 
find negative or insignificant short  to medium term employment effects (e.g. Pannenberg, 
1995; Hübler, 1998; Hujer and Wellner, 2000; Kraus, Puhani and Steiner, 2000), but there are 
also studies that obtain positive effects for some programmes (e.g. Pannenberg and Helberger, 
1997; Prey, 1999, Eichler and Lechner, 2002). The lack of robustness is due to the sensitivity 
of the results to different parametric assumptions, small sample sizes, and the inability to 
measure  medium  or  even  long run  effects,  as  well  as  problems  in  appropriately  defining 
programme and outcome variables. 
The next group of papers use new administrative data explicitly developed for the evaluation 
of training programmes. As for the previous studies, these programmes started in the early 
years after unification. Speckesser (2004) and Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) analyse 
one special type of government sponsored training programme. Based on propensity score 
matching,  they  find  negative  lock in  effects  up  to  12 18  months  after  programme  start. 
Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) obtain positive employment effects of 5 to 10 percentage 
points about 20 months after programme start. Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005b) use 
matching methods to assess the effectiveness of three types of training programmes conducted 
1993 1994 and follow outcomes over eight years after programme start. Besides the typical 
lock in effects, they find strong positive medium  to long run employment effects at a mag 
nitude of 10 15 percentage points for short training courses and for women for the longer 
training programmes.    
However, the problem with that specific data set is not only the limited sample size, the lack 
of  detailed  information  on  the  specific  type  of  training  programme,  and  the  lack  of 
information on other programmes, but also the measures for the short  to medium run labour 
market outcomes. The data do not allow distinguishing between unsubsidised employment in 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Speckesser (2004), Bergemann (2005). These studies use the German Socioeconomic Panel or the Labour Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    2 
the  regular  labour  market  and  subsidised  employment,  such  as  non market  jobs  in 
employment programmes, which is in fact part of the active labour market policy.  
The third generation of data used to evaluate active labour market policies in East Germany 
comes from the so called 'integrated employment histories (IEH)' data base of the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB). These data are used in this paper as well. Compared to the 
previous administrative data available for East Germany, the IEH covers a larger sample, 
contains  much  more  detailed  programme  and  outcome  information,  and  improves 
substantially the information about the selection process. Due to the latter, all papers using 
this data so far are based on a selection on observables strategy to identify the causal effects 
of the programmes. Almost all employ some sort of semiparametric matching estimator. The 
general disadvantage of this database, which covers programmes and outcomes from 2000 to 
mid 2005 in its most recent version, is that only short to medium term outcomes are available. 
This limited time horizon is the price to pay when interest is in recent programmes. For 
example,  in  our  study,  which  is  based  on  matching  estimation  as  well,  we  consider 
programme  participation  between  2000  and  2002.  Thus,  we  observe  outcomes  for  all 
participants  only  up  to  2.5  years.
2  However,  as  shown  by  Lechner,  Miquel,  and  Wunsch 
(2005a, 2005b), after 30 months we can already get a reasonably accurate idea about the 
magnitude  of  possible  long term  effects,  at  least  for  the  shorter  programmes.  All  papers 
analysing recent programmes have (and have to have) a similarly short or even shorter time 
horizon.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Market Monitor East or for Saxony Anhalt (see the survey by Wunsch, 2005).  
2   Going  beyond  that  time  horizon  would  imply  dropping  late  starts.  Thus,  the  differences  after  2.5  years 
compared to the earlier results would reflect differences in the composition of participants, content of the 
programmes as well as effects that need longer time to materialise. Since such a composite effect is difficult 
to interpret as a policy parameter, we refrain from presenting these numbers.  Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    3 
There are two groups of papers based on this database so far, depending whether they evalu 
ate training programmes or employment programmes. Concerning the training programmes, 
Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2006) analyse the effects of programmes conducted in the period 
2000 2002 on the transition rate into regular employment. Methodologically, this paper is an 
exception, because it is not based on matching estimation. Instead, the authors estimate a 
multivariate mixed proportional hazard rate model. Because of the short time horizon avail 
able to observe outcomes in their study, the negative lock in effects drive their results. Based 
on similar data, Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Waller (2006) analyse the effects of 
three broad groups of training programmes for participants in 2000 until 2001 using matching 
methods. The authors conclude that about 20 months after the start of the programmes, there 
are no or only very small effects that are hard to pin down precisely.
3 
Using a different version of the IEH, several papers by Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomson (2004, 
2005a, 2005b) analyse the effects of employment programmes by comparing participants in 
February 2000 with eligible nonparticipants in the same month. Based on matching methods, 
they conclude that after 3 years the programmes did not improve the employment chances of 
their participants. 
Our paper contributes in several dimensions to a better understanding of the individual effects 
of East German labour market programmes. First, this is the first study looking jointly at the 
effects of a large variety of training programmes as well as two employment programmes, 
allowing interesting comparisons across programme types. We do not only compare the pro 
grammes to some nonparticipation state, but also compare them with each other. The latter 
comparison gives interesting hints about the effectiveness of the caseworkers' allocation of 
                                                           
3   There is also the report for the government about the recent labour market reform in 2004 as suggested by the 
so called Hartz Kommission (see Schneider, Brenke, Kaiser, Steinwede, Jesske, Uhlendorff, 2006) which Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    4 
different participants into different programmes. Second, we find interesting differences of the 
effects of the programmes with respect to individual heterogeneity of their participants: For 
example, their effects are much worse for individuals who have good pre programme labour 
market prospects. Third, compared to the studies looking at post unification training pro 
grammes, we have much larger samples, better information on the type of programmes, on 
individual labour market outcomes, as well as on the selection process into the programmes. 
Thus, we obtain considerably more comprehensive and more robust results as before. Finally, 
the paper contains new interesting findings that appear to be of policy relevance. Those results 
can be summarised as follows:  
Programme participation leads to increased unemployment, more programme participation, 
and increased benefit receipt.  
With respect to the chances in the regular labour market, some programmes actually harm 
participants, while other programmes did at least not increase the chances of their participants. 
There is so far no sign that there will be any positive long term effects. 
The selection process into the different programme types was not optimal, because a different 
allocation  of  participants  among  the  programmes  would  have  improved  employment. 
Furthermore,  too  many  people  with  intact  labour  market  chances  end  up  in  programmes. 
Those people fared worst among all participants. 
From the analysis, it appears clear that in the very depressed labour market of East Germany, 
the recent active labour market policy did not help in reintegrating the unemployed back into 
the unsubsidised part of the labour market. If one pursues the view that active labour market 
policies are supposed to cure some malfunctioning of the labour market, than one is led to 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
contains some hints about possible effects of training in East Germany. Those hints clearly provide no robust 
evidence for positive effects. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    5 
conclude that with such amount of malfunctioning as seen in East Germany, this cure is not 
strong enough. It appears instead that other more substantial changes may be required that 
attack the roots of the problems, and not only its symptoms. However, these findings do not 
necessarily imply that the programmes had no positive effects on their participants, it just im 
plies that those effects are probably in a different sphere (receiving earnings from work in 
stead of benefits, having a daily routine, etc.) than earnings and employment in the regular 
labour market. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The next section briefly reviews the eco 
nomic and institutional environment of the East German labour market. Section 3 describes 
the data. Section 4 outlines our approach to identification and estimation of the programme 
effects. Section 5 contains the results from the econometric matching estimations. Section 6 
discusses some of the sensitivity and heterogeneity checks conducted. The last section draws 
policy conclusions. Appendix A gives more information on the data used. Appendix B con 
tains some more details on the econometrics applied, while Appendix C contains additional 
results not presented in the main body of the text. Finally, an appendix that is available in the 
internet contains more detailed background material concerning estimation, data, and results. 
2  Economic conditions and labour market policy in East Germany  
2.1  Economic development since German Unification 
After the near collapse of the East German economy following German Unification (by De 
cember 1990, production of goods had dropped to 46% of its 1989 level; Akerlof et al., 1991), 
the East German work force had declined by almost 3 million people in 1991 (BA, 2001). A 
substantial part of these people was directly absorbed by active labour market programmes to 
the effect that the official unemployment rate   which does not include participants in ALMP Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    6 
– is not skyrocketing. Furthermore, many older people left the labour force encouraged by 
generous early retirement schemes. In spite of this, registered unemployment rose rapidly to a 
rate of more than 10 per cent in 1991 (BA, 1992). Since then, the East German economy has 
been  recovering  only  slowly.  Unemployment  has  risen  steadily  and  has  become  very 
persistent with a fraction of long term unemployed of 40% in 2005. The fraction of young 
people and persons with low education or health problems has also increased steadily while 
female unemployment is declining, because more women leave the labour force. 
Table1: GDP growth and unemployment since 1993 
  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005 
GDP growth  12.6  6.3  1.9  2.8  1.1  1.0  -0.1 
Unemployment rate  15  15  19  19  19  20  19 
Thereof:               
Women  65  64  58  54  51  49  47 
Non German  3  4  4  4  5  5  6 
No professional degree  23  21  21  24  24  23  26 
Age < 25  12  11  12  12  13  12  14 
Age ≥ 55  8  16  20  21  15  10  12 
Unemployed for more than 1 year  31  29  30  32  35  43  40 
Health problems  10  14  16  19  21  21  24 
Note:  Entries are in percent.  
Sources: Statistische Ämter der Länder (2006), BA (1992-2006). 
2.2  Unemployment insurance in Germany 1998-2004  
In Germany, unemployment insurance (UI) is compulsory for all employees with more than a 
minor employment including apprentices in vocational training.
4 German UI does not cover 
self employed. Persons who have contributed to the UI for at least 12 months within the three 
years preceding an unemployment spell are eligible for unemployment benefits (UB). The 
minimum UB entitlement is six months. In the period we consider, the maximum claim in 
creases stepwise with the total duration of the contributions in the seven years before becom 
ing unemployed, and age, up to a maximum of 32 months at age 54 or above with previous Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    7 
contributions of at least 64 months.
5 Actual payment of UB for eligible unemployed is condi 
tional on active job search, regular show up at the public employment service (PES), and par 
ticipation in ALMP measures. Since 1994, the replacement rate is 67% of previous average 
net earnings from insured employment with dependent children, and 60% without.  
Until 2005, unemployed became eligible for unemployment assistance (UA) after exhaustion 
of UB. In contrast to UB, UA was means tested and potentially indefinite. However, like UB, 
UA was proportional to previous earnings but with lower replacement rates than UB (57% / 
53% with / without dependent children, respectively). Unemployed who were ineligible for 
UB and UA could receive social assistance, which was a fixed monthly payment unrelated to 
previous earnings, means tested and administered by local authorities. 
2.3  East German ALMP 1998-2005 
Directly after unification, short time work, which is a reduction in work hours combined with 
a subsidy from the unemployment insurance system to compensate the resulting earnings loss, 
subsidised  non market  jobs  (so called  job  creation  schemes,  JCS),  and  further  vocational 
training (FVT) was used on a rather massive scale. In recent years, however, the focus shifted 
towards  the  internationally  more  common  minor  adjustments  of  skills  in  short  so called 
training measures (which are much cheaper than FVT). Furthermore, direct temporary wage 
subsidies as well as the support of self employment increased at the expense of subsidised 
non market jobs (see Table 2). 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
4   However, civil servants (Beamte), judges, professional soldiers, clergymen and some other groups of persons 
are exempted from contributions. For further details on the German UI and ALMP, see the comprehensive 
survey by Wunsch (2005). 
5   For example, a 40 year old unemployed with at least two years of insured employment has a maximum claim 
of 12 months. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    8 
Table 2: The most important instruments of ALMP in East Germany (1998-2005) 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
  Expenditure in million EUR 
Total expenditure on ALMP   7920  8964  8620  8360  8265  7326  5042  2454 
  Share in % 
Training measures (TM)  1  1  2  2  2  3  4  2 
Further vocational training (FVT)  37  33  34  36  35  27  25  16 
Short-time work  1  1  1  1  1  1  2  3 
Job creation schemes (JCS)  35  32  31  25  22  18  19  7 
Structural adjustment measures (SAM)  18  17  14  9  8  7  7  6 
Temporary wage subsidies  2  3  5  7  10  12  12  8 
Support of self-employment  2  2  3  3  3  6  14  36 
Other  4  10  11  17  19  26  17  21 
  Participation in 1000 
Training measures (TM)a  NA  167  191  227  332  376  400  287 
Further vocational training (FVT)a  236  183  214  188  183  92  61  40 
Short-time workb  34  27  24  27  45  35  29  25 
Job creation schemes (JCS)b  151  168  153  123  92  70  65  36 
Structural adjustment measures (SAM)b  162  180  98  67  58  40  28  12 
Temporary wage subsidiesb  NA  65  91  99  116  107  90  29 
Support of self-employmentb  NA  32  30  31  34  72  68  105 
Note:  NA: Not available. a Entries in 1000 persons. b Yearly average of stock in 1000 persons.  
Source:  BA (1992-2006). 
One important feature of German ALMP is the large heterogeneity of training courses. Course 
contents, the amount of human capital added and planned durations vary considerably, par 
ticularly among FVT courses. With our data (see Section 3), we are able to account for het 
erogeneity in training measures and FVT in a detailed way.  
Table 3: Descriptions of the programmes we evaluate 
Programme type (acronym)  Description  Mean planned  
duration (days) 
Short combined measures (SCM)  Acquisition of specific knowledge and skills  56 
Jobseeker assessment (JSA)  Assessment of jobseekers ability and willingness to search for 
job and to work, basic job search assistance 
45 
Short training (ST)  Minor adjustment of skills  48 
Job related training (JRT)  Combined off-the-job and on-the-job training in a specific field of 
profession 
172 
General further training  
  ≤ 9 months GT-9M) 
General update, adjustment and extension of knowledge and 
skills; mainly off the job, planned duration ≤ 9 months 
173 
General further training 
  > 9 months (GT-9M+) 
General update, adjustment and extension of knowledge and 
skills; mainly off the job, planned duration > 9 months 
347 
Degree course (DC)  Vocational training that awards a formal professional degree and 
that corresponds to regular vocational training in the German 
apprenticeship system 
658 
Job creation scheme (JCS)  Subsidised non-market jobs which are in the interest of the public  274 
Structural adjustment measure 
(SAM) 
Subsidised non-market jobs in economically weak regions  315 
Note:  Calculations of the mean planned durations are based on our evaluation sample (see Section 3.3). Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    9 
Table 3 summarises the programme types we evaluate in our empirical analyses. Besides 
seven types of training courses, we evaluate the most important forms of subsidised non mar 
ket  jobs.  We  do  not  include  temporary  wage  subsidies  and  support  of  self employment 
though,  because  our  identification  strategy  (see  Section  4)  might  not  be  valid  for  these 
programmes. Short time work is not observable in our data. 
Short combined measures (SCM) are a series of very short training courses aiming at remov 
ing specific minor skill deficits. Jobseeker assessment (JSA) courses have the main objective 
of assessing a jobseeker's availability, willingness, and ability for active job search or specific 
kinds of jobs or programmes, but they also provide basic job search assistance. Short training 
(ST) courses provide minor adjustments of skills. All three types of programmes belong to the 
category  of  so called  training  measures  (TM)  and  have  durations  of  no  more  than  three 
months with mean planned durations of below two months.  
Job related training (JRT) combines off the job training with a substantial amount of on the 
job training in a specific field of profession, where the latter often takes place in a simulated 
work environment rather than a regular firm. The mean planned duration is about six months. 
General training (GT) subsumes the classical, mainly off the job, further vocational training 
courses which provide a general update, adjustment, and extension of knowledge and skills. 
Planned durations range from only a few months to up to two years. Degree courses (DC) 
provide a usually two year training which is equivalent to an apprenticeship in the German 
apprenticeship system. It awards an officially recognised professional degree if completed 
successfully. JRT, GT, and DC belong to the category of further vocational training (FVT). 
Job creation schemes (JCS) and structural adjustment measures (SAM) are subsidised jobs, 
which are outside of and should not compete with the regular labour market. JCS are targeted 
at unemployed with particularly bad employment prospects like the elderly or the long term Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    10 
unemployed. SAM aim at smoothing the effects of large job losses in a region by absorbing 
the unemployed in subsidised employment. In both programmes, participants hold these jobs 
usually for about one year. 
2.4   Interactions between programme participation and UI payments 
One important feature of German labour market policy has always been that (most) pro 
gramme participations extend the period in which unemployment benefits (UB) can poten 
tially be drawn. The extension occurs either directly by explicitly counting programme par 
ticipation in the same way as insured employment towards the acquisition of UB claims. Or it 
occurs indirectly by receiving a different form of benefit (so called maintenance allowance, 
MA, during participation in FVT) of the same amount as UB (or UA) during participation 
without or only less than proportionately reducing the UB claim at programme start. Table 4 
summarises the respective rules. 
Table 4: Programme participation and accumulation of benefits  
Year  Programme  Rules 
FVT  Receipt of MA if eligible; UB claim stays constant; counts in the same way as insured employment  Until 
1997  JCS  Regular salary, no benefits; counts as insured employment 
TM  Receipt of UB or UA if eligible; UB claim reduced by the programme duration 




JCS, SAM  Regular salary, no benefits; counts as insured employment 
TM  Receipt of UB or UA if eligible; UB claim reduced by the programme duration 
FVT  Receipt of MA if eligible; UB claim reduced by half of the programme duration; entitlement qualifica-
tion period extended by up to 2 years 
2003-
2004 
JCS, SAM  Regular salary, no benefits; no longer counts as insured employment 
TM  Receipt of UB or UA if eligible; UB claim reduced by the programme duration 
FVT  Receipt of UB or UA  if eligible; UB claim reduced by half of the programme duration 
Since 
2005 
JCS, SAM  Regular salary, no benefits; does not count as insured employment 
Note:  TM and SAM have been introduced in 1998. The regular entitlement qualification period are the three years before 
the beginning of an unemployment spell in which the duration of insured employment is counted for the acquisition 
of an UB claim. At least 12 months of insured employment within this period are needed to acquire a new UB claim 
and the total claim increases with the duration of insured employment in the seven years before the beginning of an 
unemployment spell. 
Since 1998, all major reforms of German labour market policy have reduced the possibilities 
to renew or extent UB claims by programme participation as legislators have increasingly Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    11 
become aware of the adverse effects these rules have on search intensity and the budget of the 
public employment agency (PES).  
3  Data and definition of the evaluation sample 
3.1   The data 
We use a new administrative database that has been built up by the Institute for Employment 
Research (IAB). The database is a 2% random sample from all individuals who have been 
subject to German social insurance at least once since 1990. It combines information from 
four different administrative sources: social insurance records, programme participation data 
as well as the benefit payment register and the jobseeker register of the PES. Table A.1 in 
Appendix A summarises the main features of these data sources. 
Besides being very recent, the database is very rich in terms of covariate information and ob 
served pre programme employment histories (at least 10 years) to control for selectivity in 
programme  participation  (see  Section  4.1).  Moreover,  it  covers  participation  in  all  major 
German active labour market programmes for the unemployed from 2000 to mid 2005, and 
the information about programmes is very detailed so that it is possible to account for pro 
gramme heterogeneity in a uniquely detailed way. 
Nevertheless, the database also has several drawbacks that may be important for the interpre 
tation of our results. Firstly, information on direct programme costs is not available in the 
data. It is therefore not possible to consider the actual net effects of programmes. Secondly, 
prior to 2000 there is no explicit information on participation in ALMP except for benefit 
payment during participation in training. In particular, it is not possible to distinguish subsi 
dised from non subsidised employment. Thirdly, the common observation period after pro 
gramme start is relatively short (only 2.5 years) since we are interested in relatively recent Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    12 
programmes conducted 2000 2002. Because of the rather long durations of some programmes 
(see Table 1), Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005a, b) show that the ability to measure long 
run effects is crucial for the evaluation of German ALMP. However, their results also imply 
that after 30 months we can already get a reasonable idea about the magnitude of possible 
long term effects, at least for the shorter programmes.
6  
3.2  Definition of our evaluation sample and programme participation 
Our population of interest is defined by those unemployed who receive unemployment bene 
fits (UB) or unemployment assistance (UA) and who are eligible for programme participation. 
According to German legislation, this is also the main target group of German ALMP. Our 
sample consists of the inflow into unemployment from insured employment or out of labour 
force between January 2000 and the first half of December 2002. If there are multiple entries 
into unemployment of a person in this period, we consider the first one as the sample inflow 
date.  
When choosing the appropriate subpopulation from our inflow sample into unemployment, 
we aim at having a homogenous group of people that covers the prime age part of the East 
German
7 population who is eligible for participation in the programmes under consideration. 
Therefore, we require that all individuals were employed
8 at least once before programme 
participation and that they received unemployment benefits (UB) or assistance (UA) in the 
month before the programme start (as well as in the month of potential programme start for 
nonparticipants).
9 To avoid most influences coming from retirement, early retirement, and 
                                                           
6   The studies of Gerfin and Lechner (2002); Frölich, Lechner, and Steiger (2003); Lechner and Smith (2005) 
and Sianesi (2004) faced similar problems. 
7   We exclude Berlin. 
8   'Employed' means that we observe the person at least once in insured employment in the data. 
9   In fact, receipt of UB or UA directly before entering a programme is not sufficient to ensure eligibility. 
Individuals must also have a formal professional degree or at least three years of work experience. Thus by Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    13 
primary education, we also impose an age restriction (25 49 years). Concentrating on the 
main body of the active labour force, we exclude unemployed who were trainees, home work 
ers, apprentices, or without previous employment. Furthermore, we exclude unemployed with 
an intensity of the last employment before programme participation below half of the usual 
full time working hours. 
Note that drawing this subpopulation requires the use of variables measured relatively to the 
start date of the programme, which is only available for participants.
 Moreover, several vari 
ables potentially influencing both selection into programmes and outcomes should be meas 
ured relatively to the start of the programme. In this paper, we follow one of the approaches 
suggested by Lechner (1999, 2002b) to simulate start dates for nonparticipants. We regress 
the log start date of participants on a set of time invariant personal and regional characteristics 
and use the estimated coefficients plus a draw in the residual distribution to predict start dates 
for nonparticipants. 
We define participants as those unemployed who participate at least once in a programme in 
the three years from the inflow into our sample. Accordingly, nonparticipants are all persons 
who do not enter a programme in this period. However, since we observe outcomes only up to 
mid 2005, we only evaluate the first participation of a person in a programme that occurs after 
the date of the inflow into the sample and before 2003.  
3.3  Selected descriptive statistics 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables. The numbers indicate that entry 
into the programmes is highly selective (for a full list of variables and statistics, see the inter 
net appendix).  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
also  requiring  individuals  to  be  employed  at  least  once  before  the  programme,  the  remaining  group  of 
participants and nonparticipants is most likely to be eligible. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    14 
Table 5:  Means and shares (in %) of selected variables 
Treatment  NP  SCM  JSA  ST  JRT  GT-9M  GT-9M+  DC  JCS  SAM 
Observations  4024  429  1066  549  313  605  533  176  587  463 
  Personal characteristics 
Age (years)  38  38  37  37  37  38  38  34  40  38 
Woman  38  45  40  44  36  29  43  40  34  28 
No professional degree  11  10  10  7  8  7  6  14  10  9 
Completed apprenticeship  85  81  88  86  89  88  81  82  87  89 
University / polytechnic 
college degree  4  8  2  7  3  4  13  5  2  2 
Health problems  14  11  11  9  10  9  9  11  19  7 
  Characteristics of desired job 
Unskilled  30  28  27  22  26  21  18  38  31  24 
Skilled  66  64  71  71  72  74  67  59  66  73 
High-skilled  4  8  3  7  2  5  15  4  2  2 
No work experience 
required  8  6  8  7  6  5  5  11  7  4 
  Earnings of last job 
Monthly earnings (EUR)  1386  1400  1364  1447  1698  1445  1594  1382  1323  1343 
  Remaining unemployment benefit claim at the beginning of the current unemployment spell 
No claim  50  57  45  50  38  27  26  40  65  34 
Claim (days)  101  70  106  88  140  157  162  105  59  116 
  Employment history over the 10 years before programme start 
Duration of current unem-
ployment spell (months)  5  7  7  7  7  6  7  8  10  7 
Fraction employed  66  66  65  69  66  70  70  64  58  68 
Fraction unemployed  18  18  17  15  18  15  13  15  25  16 
Fraction out of labour force  11  10  11  10  10  9  10  15  9  9 
  Regional information 
Local unemployment rate ≤ 
15%  8  9  8  9  6  10  8  10  4  6 
Local unemployment rate > 
25%  11  7  10  8  13  12  8  11  14  13 
Note:  If not stated otherwise, entries are in percent. All variables except the duration of the current unemployment spell 
are measured at or relative to the unemployment spell in which (simulated) programme start takes place. The du-
ration of the current unemployment spell is measured at (simulated) programme start. 
Women seem to be concentrated in SCM, ST, and GT 9M+ while GT 9M, JCS, and SAM 
exhibit a male bias. DC seems to be a device to provide younger and untrained unemployed 
with a first professional degree. JCS attracts a larger share of slightly older unemployed, un 
employed with health problems, low earnings, and long unemployment durations. It often 
takes place in the regions with the highest unemployment rates. The latter is also true for 
SAM  and  JRT.  Participants  in  the  latter  seem  to  have,  however,  above  average  previous 
earnings. Nonparticipants differ from participants because of their lower current unemploy Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    15 
ment duration and their rather high fractions of untrained unemployed and unemployed with 
health problems. 
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Note:  Unsubsidised employment. Month zero is the (simulated) programme start. Negative values on the abscissa refer 
to months before programme start, positive values to the months after programme start. 
In Figure 1, we show how nonparticipants and programme participants differ in terms of (un 
subsidised) employment rates before and after programme start, and before correcting for any 
selectivity. By construction of our sample, the employment rates are zero at and in the period 
directly before programme start. Nonparticipants have substantially higher employment rates 
in the 10 months before their simulated programme start than all the different groups of par 
ticipants. Participants in JCS exhibit particularly low employment rates before programme 
start while all other participants face rather similar rates though the rates of participants in DC 
and SAM seem to fall somewhat more rapidly six months before programme start. After the 
(simulated) programme start, none of the groups reaches its pre programme levels. However, 
the employment rate of nonparticipants recovers quickly. For participants in the shortest pro 
grammes (SCM, JSA, and ST) there is also a steep ascent in the beginning but it becomes 
rather flat very early after programme start. For participants in both types of GT the ascent of 
the employment rate is somewhat delayed due to their longer durations but the development Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    16 
looks rather positive after completion of the programmes. The rates of participants in DC, 
JCS, and SAM recover only very slowly. 
To get a better understanding of how selection into different programmes works with respect 
to employment prospects, we predict the employment chances the different groups of partici 
pants would have had without a programme conditional on a rich set of covariates. This pre 
diction is based on a probit estimation of the employment chances of nonparticipants at the 
end of the observation window. For this purpose, we consider only employment that generates 
at least 90% of the earnings of the previous job. As explanatory variables, we use all variables 
that are important in the selection models for the different programme participations versus 
nonparticipation. This includes personal characteristics, variables that summarise individual 
pre programme employment histories and regional characteristics.  
In Table 6, we present various statistics for the predicted employment probabilities from this 
estimation. It shows that by various measures JCS received by far the most difficult cases in 
terms of reemployment chances (as already suggested by Figure 1), as opposed to the similar 
programme SAM whose participants appear to be very similar to the average, or even a bit 
better.  The  differences  for  the  remaining  groups  are  not  that  striking  and  there  is  a 
considerable heterogeneity within all programmes. Finally, the last column shows that the 
predicted nonparticipation employment chances are, as expected, negatively correlated with 
the  predicted  participation  probabilities.  However,  given  the  official  policies,  these 
correlations are surprisingly small. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    17 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the predicted probability to be employed in a job with at least 90% 
of previous earnings in half-month 60 after programme start 





Correlation with participation 
probability** 
Nonparticipation  NP  .27  .19  .10  .34   
Short combined measures  SCM  .27  .16  .07  .33  -.10* 
Jobseeker assessment  JSA  .26  .20  .10  .31  -.04* 
Short training  ST  .27  .19  .10  .31  -.02* 
Job related training  JRT  .29  .21  .12  .35  -.02 
General training ≤ 9 months  GT-9M  .32  .27  .15  .41  -.09* 
General training > 9 months  GT-9M+  .30  .26  .14  .38  -.09* 
Degree course  DC  .25  .18  .10  .27  -.02* 
Job creation scheme  JCS  .17  .09  .03  .15  -.22* 
Structural adjustment measure  SAM  .29  .24  .16  .34  -.05* 
Total    .27  .19  .10  .33   
Note:  Predicted probabilities from a probit estimation among nonparticipants. Dependent variable: Employed in unsubsi-
dised employment with at least 90% of the earnings of the last job before programme start, measured in half-month 
60 after programme start. * Correlation is significant on the 5% level. ** Predicted probability to participate in the 
respective programme or not to participate at all. Correlation computed in the population. 
3.4  Measurement of the labour market outcomes 
According to German legislation, the main objective of German ALMP is to reduce unem 
ployment by improving the chances of the unemployed to find regular (unsubsidised) em 
ployment. However, since in East Germany there are particularly bad labour market condi 
tions, other objectives like preventing or reducing human capital depreciation, keeping the 
unemployed attached to the labour market or providing social contacts and organised daily 
routines by "keeping them busy" in subsidised employment or training programmes without 
the direct prospect of finding a regular job have become non negligible weight. Since in a 
situation with more than 20% of people not employed, providing a decent income for those 
people and avoiding social unrests may be other implicit goals of that policy. 
We try to capture the different aspects of the potential effectiveness of the different pro 
grammes by considering a variety of outcome variables. The outcome unsubsidised employ-
ment measures the programmes' success in helping their participants to find regular employ 
ment. We also assess the quality of employment in terms of stability of the earnings compared Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    18 
to previous jobs as well as potential gains in productivity measured by actual earnings differ 
ences. In contrast, registered unemployment, which here includes programme participation, 
measures  whether  individual  unemployment  is  indeed  reduced.  The  outcome  programme 
participation assesses whether the programme participation we evaluate changes the prob 
ability of future programme participation in the same or a different programme.  
We measure whether participants are better off in terms of total earnings, i.e. the sum of 
earnings from subsidised and unsubsidised employment and any benefits from the PES. In 
contrast, to assess some of the programme costs, received benefits measures the benefits and 
subsidies paid by the PES to the unemployed. This outcome variable includes all benefits 
(UB, UA, MA) received during participation in training courses and 60% of the wages from 
subsidised employment. The latter is a conservative proxy for subsidies paid by the PES, 
since that share is not directly observable in the data. In many cases, the subsidised fraction of 
the wage is certainly much higher.  
We also assess whether the programmes succeed in keeping their participants busy through 
any form of employment or participation in any kind of programme. Finally, to enable the 
comparison with previous findings from earlier studies, we consider the outcome total em 
ployment that includes both subsidised and unsubsidised employment. In Section 5, we pre 
sent the main findings from the different outcome variables and the different comparisons of 
the programmes. Table C.1 in Appendix C contains effects accumulated over the 2.5 years in 
which we observe the various outcome variables. Further results are available in the internet 
appendix. 
All effects are measured half monthly based on time relative to the start of the programme 
(with simulated start dates for nonparticipants): Half-month 1 is the half month after the pro Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    19 
gramme started. Focusing on the beginning instead of the end takes into account the potential 
endogeneity of actual programme duration.  
4  Identification and estimation  
4.1  Conditional independence  
We are interested in the average effects of the programme on the programme participants 
compared to participation in another specific programme or no participation at all. To identify 
these parameters we rely on the conditional independence assumption to solve the selection 
problem that arises from the fact that persons in the different treatments differ systematically 
in a way that might be related to the outcome variables of interest (see Section 3.3). The 
assumption states that if we can observe all factors that jointly influence outcomes in the 
comparison state and the participation decision, then   conditional on these factors   participa 
tion and the outcomes, which the participants would have obtained in the comparison state, 
are  independent,  and  the  effects  of  interest  are  identified  (Rubin,  1974;  Imbens,  2000; 
Lechner, 2001, 2002a, b). 
Selection into programmes is determined by three main factors: eligibility, selection by case 
workers and self selection by potential participants. Eligibility is ensured by the choice of our 
evaluation sample (see Section 3.2). Given eligibility, based on an assessment of the employ 
ment prospects and the specific deficits or needs of the unemployed the caseworker decides   
usually in consultation with the potential participant – about programme participation. Ac 
cording to German legislation, caseworkers have to take into account the chances of the un 
employed for completing a specific programme successfully, and the situation in the local 
labour market. The latter is particularly important in East Germany. Therefore, we merged 
rich regional information to our data that allows us to control for local labour market condi Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    20 
tions in a detailed way. This data contains information on the industrial, employment, popula 
tion, and wealth composition of the region as well as migration streams, tax revenues and lo 
cal unemployment rates. Individual variables in our data capturing information about em 
ployment prospects and chances for successful completion of a programme include age, edu 
cational attainment, family and health status, characteristics of the desired job as well as 
employment histories for at least 10 years before the programme. The latter include informa 
tion on employment status, employers, earnings, position in previous job, specific occupation, 
and industry.  
From the point of view of the unemployed, his decision whether or not to participate in a pro 
gramme is guided by considerations very similar to those of the caseworker, but there are also 
additional reasons for joining or not joining a programme. If, for example, the unemployed 
sees no chance to find a job with or without a programme, he may prefer not to join a pro 
gramme that reduces his leisure time. This again requires controlling for all factors that de 
termine individual employment prospects and labour market conditions. Moreover, legislation 
provides rather strong incentives to participate. On the one hand, unemployed who refuse to 
join a programme, risk suspension of their unemployment benefits. On the other hand, most 
programmes count towards acquisition of new unemployment benefit claims (see Table 2). 
Therefore, we include a variable that indicates the UB claim at the beginning of an unem 
ployment spell. 
The internet appendix, Table IA.1, contains a complete list of all variables that are available 
in the data. In contrast to administrative data previously available for Germany, we observe 
whether a jobseeker has health problems or a disability affecting employability. We also ob 
serve a set of characteristics of the job the unemployed is looking for, the number of place 
ment propositions by the PES, as well as information on benefit sanctions and compliance to Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    21 
benefit  conditions  (e.g.  attendance  at  interview  with  PES  or  cooperation  with  PES  staff). 
Thus, though we are still not able to observe soft characteristics directly like motivation and 
ability of the unemployed, we have a set of previously unavailable important proxy variables 
and we are able to capture their indirect effects on pre programme employment history that is 
starting effectively observed shortly after unification in 1990. 
4.2   Estimation  
All possible parametric, semi  and nonparametric estimators of treatments effects with obser 
vational data are built on the principle that for every comparison of two programmes, for par 
ticipants in the programme of interest, we need comparison observations from the other pro 
gramme with the same distribution of relevant characteristics. Characteristics are relevant if 
they jointly influence selection and outcomes (see Section 4.1 for these variables). Here, we 
use adjusted propensity score matching estimators for multiple treatments as our baseline es 
timator to produce such comparisons. A clear advantage of these estimators is that they are 
essentially nonparametric and that they allow arbitrary individual effect heterogeneity (see 
Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999, for matching with a binary treatment, and Imbens, 
2000, and Lechner, 2001, for multiple treatments). 
To obtain estimates of the conditional choice probabilities (the so called propensity scores), 
which we use in our selection correction mechanism to form our comparison groups, we esti 
mate probit models for all comparisons (all programme types against each other as well as 
nonparticipation). The analysis revealed that gender, age, qualification, and family status are 
important individual characteristics that determine participation. Furthermore, observed em 
ployment and unemployment histories are significantly correlated with participation choice. 
Moreover, the characteristics of the desired job an unemployed is looking for differ system 
atically among programmes. Regional information, such as the industrial, employment, and Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    22 
wealth composition of the region as well as tax revenues, which entered the probits in a highly 
disaggregated way to capture the specifics of supply and demand in the local labour market, 
play important roles in the selection process. Finally, remaining unemployment benefit claims 
indeed seem to provide rather strong incentives to enter a programme.  
We use a matching procedure that incorporates the improvements suggested by Lechner, Mi 
quel, and Wunsch (2005a). These improvements aim at two issues: (i) To allow for higher 
precision when many 'good' comparison observations are available, they incorporate the idea 
of calliper or radius matching (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) into the standard algorithm 
used for example by Gerfin and Lechner (2002). (ii) Furthermore, matching quality is in 
creased by exploiting the fact that appropriate weighted regressions that use the sampling 
weights from matching have the so called double robustness property. This property implies 
that the estimator remains consistent if either the matching step is based on a correctly speci 
fied selection model, or the regression model is correctly specified (e.g. Rubin, 1979; Joffe, 
Ten Have, Feldman, and Kimmel, 2004). Moreover, this procedure should reduce small sam 
ple bias as well as asymptotic bias of matching estimators (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006) and 
thus increase robustness of the estimator. The actual matching protocol is shown in Table B.1. 
See Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005a) for more information on this estimator. 
5  The effects of programme participation 
Below  we  present  various  figures  displaying  the  average  programme  effects  of  the  pro 
gramme participants of the different programmes compared to nonparticipation for various 
outcome variables. Each line in the respective figure represents a different programme and 
relates to the effects for the specific population of participants in that programme. Dots appear 
on a particular line if the effect is pointwise significant on the 5% level. Outcomes are either 
measured in percentage points when they relate to changes in labour market status, or in dif Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    23 
ferences of EUR when they relate to some earnings or income variable. The results are given 
for every half month after the programme start, but the labeling on the corresponding axes 
refers to the respective month after the start of the programme. In the figures presented below, 
we  only  focus  on  the  comparisons  with  nonparticipation.  Extensive  inter programme 
comparisons, however, are available in the internet appendix of this paper, as well as in one of 
the following tables.. 
5.1  Programmes increase unemployment of their participants 
Figure 2 shows the first of our key findings, namely that programme participation generally 
increases individual unemployment compared to nonparticipation. From the figure, we see 
that this effect differs substantially between the programmes, but there is not a single pro 
gramme leading to a reduction in unemployment.  
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Note:  Abscissa: Months after programme start. Ordinate: Effect in %-points. Each line represents the respective popula-
tion of participants, which may differ for each programme. Dots indicate that the effect is significant on the 5% level 
(sig.). 
Generally, the negative effects are worst in the beginning and decline somewhat over time. 
They are also worse for the longer programmes: Over the 30 months considered, participants Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    24 
in DC accumulate 14 (!) months of additional unemployment, with SAM 11 months, with JCS 
8 months and with GT 9+ they accumulate 7 months (see Table C.1 in Appendix C for de 
tailed results). The increase in the unemployment duration may well be due to the fact that all 
programmes increase the period in which benefits can be received by the unemployed. 
5.2   Programmes keep participants busy and increase benefit receipt  
Figure 3 shows that the programmes do not only increase the unemployment duration, but 
they also increase the likelihood of attending another programme in the future. This seems 
particularly true for the three types of the short training measures. In total over the 2.5 years 
after programme starts, these programmes accumulate each about 5 6 months of additional 
programme participation, whereas the other programmes add about 2 3 months of additional 
programme participation. 
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Note:  See note below Figure 2. For programme participants we only consider further participations after the actual pro-
gramme evaluated. 
Table 7 shows in what kind of programmes unemployed participate. Nonparticipants also ex 
hibit some programme participation after the 3 year window for which we require them not to Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    25 
participate, mainly in the category other programmes, the largest fraction of which are tempo 
rary wage subsidies for regular jobs and support of self employment. This category is also 
frequented by most of the participants who exhibit future participations.
10 Participation in the 
short training measures is often followed by GT and for JSA also by DC. Participants in GT, 
on the other hand, often participate in a JCS after the completion of GT. 
Table 7: Further programme participation (%) 
Treatment status  Acronym  SCM  JSA  ST  JRT  GT  DC  JCS  SAM  Other 
At least 
one 
Nonparticipation  NP  1  3  2  0.1  0.8  0.2  3  0.4  7  0.16 
Short combined measures  SCM  10  8  5  2  18  6  7  2  16  0.62 
Jobseeker assessment  JSA  2  14  4  2  10  11  7  3  17  0.59 
Short training  ST  3  8  9  2  11  5  8  5  20  0.59 
Job related training  JRT  5  12  6  4  5  2  9  4  13  0.51 
General training  GT  3  9  7  1  6  1  8  3  20  0.51 
Degree course  DC  4  10  6  1  6  3  3  1  13  0.41 
Job creation scheme  JCS  4  7  3  1  4  2  13  2  20  0.49 
Structural adjustment measure  SAM  4  6  4  1  3  2  7  4  13  0.38 
Note:  The largest fraction of Other are temporary wage subsidies followed by support of self-employment. 
Our next finding in Figure 4 shows the effect of programme participation on any form of em 
ployment, including the time in any programme. It shows that one of the effects of pro 
grammes in East Germany is keeping the unemployed busy. For all programmes, Figure 4 
shows that for this definition of employment large drops occur around the time when most 
participants complete their programme. 
                                                           
10  In many cases, regular programmes were followed by periods of employment accompanied by a 6 or 12 
month wage subsidy. To avoid having to pay back that subsidy, firms have to keep the initially subsidised 
employers  for  at  least  another  period  of  unsubsidised  employment  of  the  same  length  as  the  subsidised 
employment period. Therefore, for some comparisons we see large drops in programme participation (for the 
definition of the outcome variables and the state of nonparticipation, all wage subsidy programmes are coded 
as programme participation, even if they are not explicitly evaluated in this paper) about 6 months after the 
end of a 6 month wage subsidy. See the internet appendix for all details. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    26 
Figure 4: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: subsidised and 
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Note:  See note below Figure 2. 
Figure 5 shows that the programmes do not only keep their participants busy, but the pro 
grammes (directly and indirectly) reward their participants by increasing the amount of un 
employment benefits paid to them (incl. all benefits and 60% of wages received while partici 
pating in subsidised employment). Summing up these payments over the 2.5 year horizon, it 
appears that participants in DC and SAM get an extra amount of about 8000 EUR of benefits, 
participants in GT 9M+ about 7000 EUR, in JCS about 5000 EUR, in JRT and GT 9M about 
4000 EUR, in JSA about 3500 EUR and in SCM and ST about 2500 EUR. These numbers are 
substantial and hint at the large cost of the programmes in terms of benefits and wage subsi 
dies. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    27 
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Note:  See note below Figure 2. 
5.3   Programmes do not increase the employment chances of their participants 
It should clearly be one of the primary goals of East German training and employment pro 
grammes to improve the chances of the participants to find an unsubsidised job. Figure 6 
shows that, however, after 2.5 years such effects are absent. 
The only programmes that have no, or almost no, negative effect at the end of the observation 
period  are  the  short  combined  measures  (SCM)  and  short  general  training  (GT 9M)  pro 
grammes. All other programmes have significant negative effects. However, 2.5 years might 
be too short an observation period for a programme that has a typical duration of 2 years, like 
DC, and a corresponding large (huge!) lock in effect. This programme may or may not show 
future positive effects. Even for this programme, it is worrying that the negative effect after 
2.5 years is quite large with about  15%. Certainly, for the short training programmes and 
probably also the employment programmes, the negative effects after 2.5 years are an indica 
tion that negative long run effects should be expected. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    28 
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Note:  See note below Figure 2. 
5.4  Several groups of participants would have been better off had they participated 
in a different programme 
We already saw that some groups of programme participants would have had better labour 
market chances had they not participated in any programmes. In this section, we show that 
even ignoring the option of nonparticipation, some programme groups would have fared bet 
ter had they participated in a different programme.  
Table 7 presents this comparison for all programmes and their participants (given in lines) 
compared to all alternatives (given in the columns) based on the outcome variable measuring 
unsubsidised employment. Whereas the upper part of the table contains the point in time es 
timate for the end of the observation period, the lower panel presents the number of months 
accumulated over those 2.5 years. Whenever an effect is negative, it means that on average 
the programme group would have fared better in the alternative programme. The shaded fields 
on the main diagonal of this table show the level of the outcome variable for the actual par 
ticipants in the respective programme. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    29 
Table 7: Effects of programme participation for participants in one programme had they participated 
in another programme: unsubsidised employment  
Programmes  Comparison state 
  SCM  JSA  ST  JRT  GT-9M  GT-9M+  DC  JCS  SAM  NP 
SCM  0.36  0.05  0.08  0.10  0.01  0.08  -0.02  0.13  0.14  -0.01 
JSA  -0.09  0.31  -0.04  0.02  -0.08  -0.03  0.03  0.02  0.07  -0.06* 
ST  -0.07  0.03  0.33  -0.11  -0.06  0.06  0.14  0.10  0.13  -0.06 
JRT  -0.14  -0.02  -0.07  0.32  -0.10  -0.04  -0.01  0.10  0.08  -0.09 
GT-9M  -0.04  0.06  0.00  0.10  0.42  0.07  0.22*  0.12  0.10  -0.01 
GT-9M+  -0.09  0.03  -0.01  0.07  -0.08  0.37  0.19  0.10  0.10  -0.10 
DC  -0.11  -0.06  -0.16*  -0.05  -0.15*  -0.09  0.20  -0.02  -0.02  -0.12 
JCS  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03  -0.04  -0.12*  -0.13  0.01  0.17  -0.01  -0.06 
SAM  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  -0.04  -0.09  -0.03  0.03  0.03  0.28  -0.11 
  Cumulated months over 2.5 years 
SCM  9.2  2.1*  1.1  2.6  0.8  3.8*  5.9*  4.8*  6.3*  -2.2* 
JSA  -2.4  8.2  -2.0  1.1  -0.5  2.3*  5.2*  2.2  4.3*  -4.3* 
ST  -0.4  1.3  9.4  -0.5  0.9  4.0*  7.8*  4.1*  6.0*  -3.1* 
JRT  -5.2  -1.8  -4.0*  7.5  -1.9  1.8  5.2*  1.7  4.4*  -5.8* 
GT-9M  -4.0  0.7  -1.9  1.4  9.4  3.2*  7.2*  2.7  4.8*  -4.6* 
GT-9M+  -7.0*  -1.8  -4.3*  -0.9  -3.4*  6.5  5.1*  1.6  2.9*  -8.5* 
DC  -9.3*  -5.0*  -9.3*  -4.8*  -6.3*  -3.8*  1.8  -2.3*  -1.9*  -10.4* 
JCS  -2.9  -2.5*  -2.6  -2.0  -2.3*  -2.0  1.8  3.1  0.2  -5.0* 
SAM  -7.3*  -3.3*  -5.6*  -3.2*  -3.1*  -1.8*  1.9*  -0.8  4.3  -8.6* 
Note:  Numbers in italics indicate significance on the 10% level, bold numbers on the 5% level, and * on the 1% level. 
Dark shaded entries on the diagonal are the levels of the respective potential outcome in the respective group of 
participants. Off-diagonal elements are the effects of the programme given in the line for its participants compared 
the state that those participants would have participated in the programme given as headings of a column. 
Ignoring the state of nonparticipation and taking only the case where both outcome measures 
agree, we see (at least) that participants in JSA, GT 9M+, DC, JCS, and SAM would have 
improved their employment chances had they participated in the shorter programmes in GT 
9M (or SCM). This indicates that there is room for improving the process of allocating the 
unemployed to the various programmes. 
5.5  Unemployed with reasonable chances on the labour market got hurt most 
Next, we analyse the effects of the programmes on unsubsidised employment for the groups 
with good and bad no programme labour market chances separately. This separation is per 
formed according to the no programme employment index discussed in Section 3.3.  Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    30 
The results for the group with better chances are presented in Figure 7. They are striking in 
the sense that all programmes with the exception of GT 9M (and perhaps SCM) hurt this 
group. SAM, JCS, and DC have large negative effects of about  30%, whereas the shorter 
programmes have negative effects between  10% and  20%.  
Figure 7: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: unsubsidised 
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Note:  See note below Figure 2. The employment index is equal to the predicted probabilities from a probit in the pool of 
nonparticipants. Dependent variable: employed in unsubsidised employment with at least 90% of the earnings of 
the last job before programme start, measured in half-month 60 after programme start. 
For the group which has worse labour market chances even without the programmes (Table 
8), at least none of the programmes seem to reduce employment after 30 months significantly, 
however, a significant positive effect cannot be detected either. 
A straightforward reason for this finding may be due to differential lock in effects. The better 
the pre programme employment chances, the quicker an unemployed finds a job. Therefore, 
the reduction in employment rates due to a lack of job search and reduced job offers while 
participation in a programme is larger for 'better' unemployed, leading to a larger lock in ef 
fect as compared to 'worse' unemployed who would need longer anyway to find a job. Appar 
ently, the lock in effects got so large that 'good' programme participants could recover. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    31 
Figure 8: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: unsubsidised 
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Note:  See note below Figure 2. The employment index is equal to the predicted probabilities from a probit in the pool of 
nonparticipants. Dependent variable: employed in unsubsidised employment with at least 90% of the earnings of 
the last job before programme start, measured in half-month 60 after programme start. 
5.6  Why were the previous results more positive?  
In a previous study by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005b) that was based on a similar 
methodology, we found generally more positive effects of the training programmes that were 
in effect 10 years earlier. For the three training programmes that we looked at (there was no 
information on employment programmes and subsidies in the old data), we found positive 
effects for retraining (similar to DC) after about 35 months. This is beyond our horizon avail 
able in this paper, but for the shorter training programmes we obtained significant positive 
effects  compared  to  nonparticipation  after  25  months  for  training  courses  longer  than  6 
months,  and  after  about  12  months  for  training  courses  6  months  and  shorter.  What  has 
changed? One thing that is different between the two studies is that for the first six years the 
old data did not allow to distinguish subsidised and non subsidised employment.  
Figure 9 presents the results of our current analysis based on an employment variable similar 
to the one used previously. We see that the negative effects of programmes disappear, with Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    32 
the exception of DC, which still shows negative effects of about  15%. However, no positive 
effects occur either, leading us to the conclusion that the definition of the outcome variable is 
not the reason for the discrepancies in the findings of the two papers. 
Figure 9: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: total (subsidised and 
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Note:  See note below Figure 2. 
Since there is no data available on programmes between 1997 and 2000, it is very hard to 
analyse the reasons for the changes. It could be that the programme quality, or the quality of 
the selection process into the programmes, or the quality of the suitable potential participants 
declined, or that the labour market changed in a direction that made it harder to reward pro 
gramme participation. This issue remains open for future research. 
6  Sensitivity checks 
We conducted several sensitivity analyses, the details of which are given in the internet ap 
pendix. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    33 
We did not find any substantial heterogeneity of the programme effects for the socio eco 
nomic groups we looked at, other than the general feature mentioned above, namely that un 
employed with intact pre programme labour market chances fair worse than unemployed with 
bad pre programme labour market chances. 
With respect to the technical properties of the estimation, we varied the criteria to define the 
common support as well as the time window used to define participation as well as nonpar 
ticipation, but no significant differences appeared. 
7  Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyse the most important components of the East German active labour 
market policy between 2000 and 2002. Our empirical investigation is based on a well suited, 
large, and informative individual database of participants and nonparticipants that originated 
from administrative records. These data are analysed with econometric matching methods. 
We considered various labour market outcomes over a period of 30 months after the respec 
tive programmes started. Our analysis leads us to the following policy conclusions: 
If the success of the programmes is measured by the primary goal of the official active labour 
market policy (ALMP), namely, ALMP should bring its participants back into jobs in the first 
labour  market,  all  programmes  failed.  They  do  not  improve  the  employment  chances  or 
earnings. In particular, for the group of individuals with better employment chances in the 
labour market, several programmes reduce those chances by a considerable amount. This 
finding is however not surprising. By using training and employment programmes, active 
labour market policies can at best reduce unemployment due to mismatch in the labour mar 
ket. Furthermore, it may prevent a deterioration of the general human capital of the workforce 
due to individual interruptions of the employment spells and the lack of learning on the job 
while in unemployment. ALMP can certainly not solve the deep structural problems in the Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    34 
labour market experienced in East Germany over the last decade. In other words, it tries to 
alleviate some of symptoms of the sickness of the East German labour market, but cannot 
cure the disease. 
If ALMP has to fail to deliver better individual labour market outcomes given the specific 
circumstances of the East German economy, could it still be worthwhile running ALMP pro 
grammes? Indeed, one may argue that ALMP is still required in East Germany at least for two 
reasons: The first reason is that participation in those programmes keeps people busy and pro 
vides them with some income from work or work related tasks. In other words, it may be and 
is used to combat social unrest in an environment that saw (official) unemployment rates 
around 20% for a long time, and non employment rates that are considerably higher. The sec 
ond reason for having ALMP could be to keep people ready for work, i.e. use short training 
and employment programmes to keep their working skills and human capital from deteriorat 
ing, so that they actually will find jobs when (if) the structural problems of the East German 
economy will be overcome and the economy will ultimately pick up. Our analysis shows that 
the programmes are effective in the first dimension. The effectiveness in the second dimen 
sion however remains to be seen. 
Taking those arguments seriously, an active labour market policy for East Germany should 
give  up  the  goal  to  increase  the  individual  probability  of  unemployed  to  find  regular 
employment, which cannot be achieved anyway. Instead, it should concentrate on the two 
smaller goals explained above, which are worth to reach as well. However, such a policy 
would look differently than the one we analysed. In particular, it would drastically reduce the 
expensive long term courses that make only sense if the unemployed were educated with 
skills that are in considerable short supply, which does not appear to be the case on a large 
scale in East Germany. Unemployed should participate in employment programmes and take Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    35 
up jobs related to hiring subsidies, even if those jobs will only be of a temporary nature. Fur 
thermore, sending unemployed from time to time to shorter training programmes to practice 
and update their skills should also be considered as worthwhile. However, there remains the 
overarching issue about the costs to reach the limited goals of such a policy. Although costs 
would be probably somewhat smaller than for today's policy, it is not clear at all how much 
the taxpayer will be willing to pay for such a reorganised active labour market policy in East 
German. 
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Appendix A: Data  
A.1  Features of the data sources merged in the combined database 
Table A.1: Data sources used 





Dec. 2004  
Times of insured employment; personal 
characteristics  
Form of employment, industry, earnings, posi-
tion in job; profession, education, age, gender, 





Jun. 2005  
Times of receipt of unemployment  
benefits, unemployment assistance  
or maintenance allowance; personal  
characteristics  
Type and amount of benefit, remaining benefit 
claim, benefit sanctions; marital status, number 






Participation in ALMP measures;  
programme information; personal  
characteristics  
Type of programme, planned and actual dura-
tion, (un)successful completion, capacity; pro-





Jun. 2005  
Job search relevant information;  
personal characteristics  
Desired form of employment, reason for deter-
mination of last employment, number of job 
offers, compliance to benefit conditions, date of 
last interview, health problems and judgement 
whether these affect employability  
 
A.2  Further details on the data 
Several groups of people are not included in the data either because they have not been sub 
ject to social insurance contributions like civil servants and the self employed, or because 
they receive benefits that are not administered by the PES like recipients of social assistance. 
However, focusing on unemployed individuals who receive unemployment benefits or unem 
ployment assistance   which is the main target group of German ALMP and for whom is full 
record of these people in the data   alleviates this problem to a large extend. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    40 
Appendix B: Technical details of the matching estimator used  
Table B.1: A matching protocol for the estimation of a counterfactual outcome and the effects 
Step 1  Specify a reference distribution defined by X.  
Step 2  Pool the observations forming the reference distribution and the participants in the respective period. Code an 
indicator variable W, which is 1 if the observation belongs to the reference distribution. All indices, 0 or 1, used 
below relate to the actual or potential values of W. 
Step 3  Specify and estimate a binary probit for  ( ): ( 1| ) p x P W X x = = =  
Step 4  Restrict sample to common support: Delete all observations with probabilities larger than the smallest maximum 
and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples defined by W.  
Step 4  Estimate the respective (counterfactual) expectations of the outcome variables. 
 
Standard propensity score matching step (multiple treatments) 
a-1) Choose one observation in the subsample defined by W=1 and delete it from that pool. 
b-1) Find an observation in the subsample defined by W=0 that is as close as possible to the one chosen in step 
a-1) in terms of  ( ), p x x ɶ . 'Closeness' is based on the Mahalanobis distance. Do not remove that 
observation, so that it can be used again.  
c-1) Repeat a-1) and b-1) until no observation with W=0 is left. 
 
Exploit thick support of X to increase efficiency (radius matching step) 
d-1) Compute the maximum distance (d) obtained for any comparison between member of reference distribution 
and matched comparison observations. 
a-2) Repeat a-1). 
b-2) Repeat b-1). If possible, find other observations in the subsample of W=0 that are at least as close as R * d 
to the one chosen in step a-2) (to gain efficiency). Do not remove these observations, so that they can 
be used again. Compute weights for all chosen comparisons observations that are proportional to their 
distance. Normalise the weights such that they add to one. 
c-2) Repeat a-2) and b-2) until no participant in W=1 is left. 
d-2) For any potential comparison observation, add the weights obtained in a-2) and b-2). 
 
Exploit double robustness properties to adjust small mismatches by regression 
e) Using the weights  ( ) i w x  obtained in d-2), run a weighted linear regression of the outcome variable on the 
variables used to define the distance (and an intercept).  
f-1) Predict the potential outcome 
0( ) i y x  of every observation using the coefficients of this regression: 
0 ˆ ( ) i y x .  
f-2) Estimate the bias of the matching estimator for  









W w y x W y x
N N =
= =
− ∑ . 
g) Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in d-2), compute a weighted mean of the outcome variables 
in W=0. Subtract the bias from this estimate to get   0 ( | 1) E Y W = . 
Step 5  Repeat Steps 2 to 4 with the nonparticipants playing the role of participants before. This gives the desired esti-
mate of the counterfactual nonparticipation outcome. 
Step 6  The difference of the potential outcomes gives is the desired estimate of the effect with respect to the reference 
distribution specified in Step 1. 
Note:  We use the fixed-weight heteroscedasticity robust standard errors suggested by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch 
(2005a). Since participants and nonparticipants are independent, variance of the effect is the sum of the variances 
of the potential outcomes.  x ɶ  includes gender, elapsed unemployment duration until programme start, and pro-
gramme start date.  x ɶ  is included to ensure a high match quality with respect to these critical variables. R is fixed 
to 90% in this application (different values are checked in the sensitivity analysis). Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    41 
Appendix C: Additional results 
Table C.1: Cumulated outcomes 2.5 years after programme start 

























SCM  NP  -2.2*  -2.0*  0.3  4.2*  5.4*  5.1*  -3388*  2703*  584 
(N = 417)  JSA  2.1*  1.7*  2.1  -2.4  0.1  -0.3  3269*  -677  2628 
  ST  1.1  1.0  0.6  -0.7  0.2  1.3  1593  14  1359 
  JRT  2.6  1.4  3.2  -2.1  2.6*  0.5  3798  -126  4011 
  GT ≤ 9 Months  0.8  -0.3  0.1  -1.5  1.7  -1.4  1439  -1464  -192 
  GT > 9 Months  3.8*  2.7*  5.6*  -3.7  4.1*  -0.9  6237*  -1616  5501* 
  DC  5.9*  3.2*  8.3*  -7.2  4.7*  -7.7  7848*  -4327  4719 
  JCS  4.8*  3.2*  -3.8  -4.9  3.8*  0.0  7440*  -2692  959 
  SAM  6.3*  3.6*  -5.6  -6.8  4.4*  -1.6  9302*  -5067*  -1043 
JSA  NP  -4.3*  -3.1*  -1.5*  6.5*  5.6*  5.5*  -5654*  3509*  -911 
(N = 1081)  SCM  -2.4  -2.0  -2.0  2.9  0.9  0.6  -3630  1420  -2089 
  ST  -2.0  -0.5  -2.3  2.7  1.2  1.5  -2311  1679*  -839 
  JRT  1.1  0.3  2.0  -0.6  2.6*  2.0  528  -43  839 
  GT ≤ 9 Months  -0.5  -0.3  0.2  0.2  2.9*  0.8  -1410  -359  -1424 
  GT > 9 Months  2.3*  1.6*  3.5*  -2.1  3.6*  -0.6  3732*  -1670  2577 
  DC  5.2*  2.5*  7.3*  -5.9  4.1*  -5.6  6715*  -4259  3536 
  JCS  2.2  0.7  -5.8*  -2.0  3.7*  0.2  2940  -1582  -1992 
  SAM  4.3*  2.0*  -9.1*  -4.7  4.6*  -2.7  6058*  -4507*  -4405 
ST  NP  -3.1*  -2.7*  0.1  4.6*  5.4*  4.2*  -4370*  2555*  -262 
(N = 551)  SCM  -0.4  -0.9  0.7  -0.1  -0.3  -0.3  -734  -296  -476 
  JSA  1.3  1.2  1.5  -2.1  -0.6  -1.9  2496  -1475  1063 
  JRT  -0.5  0.4  1.1  -0.1  2.3  -2.0  -360  762  1156 
  GT ≤ 9 Months  0.9  0.3  2.1  -2.1  2.8*  -0.5  599  -956  234 
  GT > 9 Months  4.0*  2.7*  6.3*  -4.4  4.0*  -0.1  5773*  -2365  4489 
  DC  7.8*  4.3*  10.7*  -9.7  4.6*  -6.4  10841*  -7093*  5197 
  JCS  4.1*  1.8  -5.3  -4.0  3.5*  -2.4  6486*  -2487  25 
  SAM  6.0*  3.5*  -6.3  -7.8*  4.5*  -2.7  9083*  -5025*  -1309 
To be continued. Lechner and Wunsch, 2006    42 
Table C.1: Cumulated outcomes 2.5 years after programme start - continued  

























JRT  NP  -5.8*  -3.7*  -3.7*  7.3*  2.6*  3.2*  -7909*  3776*  -3181 
(N = 323)  SCM  -5.2  -3.4  -5.0  4.5  -0.3  -1.0  -5600  1968  -3659 
  JSA  -1.8  0.1  -2.9*  1.1  -2.5*  -2.5  -998  486  -928 
  ST  -4.0*  -1.3  -5.6*  4.2  -1.6  -1.5  -3684  2007  -2619 
  GT ≤ 9 Months  -1.9  -1.2  -1.5  1.3  0.6  -0.6  -2051  476  -1471 
  GT > 9 Months  1.8  2.1*  2.7  -2.8  0.9  -1.7  3786  -1810  2337 
  DC  5.2*  3.3*  7.0*  -6.5  0.8  -6.3  7934*  -5491  3291 
  JCS  1.7  2.1  -6.8*  -2.3  -0.7  -1.7  2721  -1896  -2830 
  SAM  4.4*  2.6*  -10.0*  -4.5  1.4*  -4.0  7261*  -4218*  -3028 
GT ≤ 9 Months  NP  -4.6*  -3.5*  -2.8*  6.9*  2.7*  3.9*  -6514*  4134*  -1478 
(N = 619)  SCM  -4.0  -1.9  -3.8  4.2  -0.9  -1.2  -6295  1912  -4504 
  JSA  0.7  0.9  -0.4  -0.5  -3.3*  -1.9  1977  -57  1462 
  ST  -1.9  -0.1  -3.5*  2.6  -2.0*  -0.4  -1561  1671  -739 
  JRT  1.4  0.5  1.1  -0.4  -0.9  0.8  1653  700  2347 
  GT > 9 Months  3.2*  2.7*  3.3*  -3.4*  0.3  -1.5  5697*  -2081*  3709 
  DC  7.2*  5.0*  8.9*  -8.2  0.6  -5.9  10968*  -6444*  5324 
  JCS  2.7  1.7  -7.1*  -3.0  -0.2  -1.7  4982  -1546  -828 
  SAM  4.8*  2.8*  -10.1*  -4.9  1.4*  -4.3  7925*  -4498*  -3684 
GT > 9 Months  NP  -8.5*  -5.6*  -6.9*  11.0*  2.3*  4.8*  -13772*  6848*  -6133* 
(N = 538)  SCM  -7.0*  -2.6  -7.8*  7.4*  -1.5  -0.4  -11670*  4215*  -8167 
  JSA  -1.8  -1.7  -3.2*  2.3  -3.9*  -0.3  -2932  1264  -2424 
  ST  -4.3*  -2.3*  -5.5*  5.5*  -2.1*  1.9  -6503*  3233*  -4018 
  JRT  -0.9  -1.3  -1.1  1.2  -0.6  3.0  -4632  1710  -2953 
  GT ≤ 9 Months  -3.4*  -2.0*  -3.5*  3.3  -0.8  1.0  -6090*  1642  -4531 
  DC  5.1*  2.7*  6.5*  -5.8  1.2  -3.6  7338*  -5461  2580 
  JCS  1.6  0.6  -10.8*  -1.8  -0.7  -0.1  3009  -699  -2969 
  SAM  2.9*  1.0  -14.2*  -3.3  0.7  -3.5  4356*  -3727  -7369 
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Table C.1: Cumulated outcomes 2.5 years after programme start - continued  

























DC  NP  -10.4*  -6.3*  -10.0*  14.1*  1.1*  12.1*  -14706*  8213*  -6291* 
(N = 170)  SCM  -9.3*  -5.5*  -10.9*  10.7*  -3.8*  6.7*  -13091*  6304*  -7690 
  JSA  -5.0*  -3.6*  -7.2*  5.5*  -5.3*  6.1*  -6617*  3984*  -3662* 
  ST  -9.3*  -4.5*  -11.4*  11.2*  -2.9*  7.0*  -12251*  7107*  -6231 
  JRT  -4.8*  -3.6*  -7.1*  5.8  -2.9*  8.0*  -7470*  3970*  -4553 
  GT ≤ 9 Months  -6.3*  -4.2*  -7.8*  7.0*  -1.8*  7.8*  -9059*  4749*  -5009* 
  GT > 9 Months  -3.8*  -2.0*  -4.3*  4.2  -0.6  6.0*  -5547*  3087*  -2697 
  JCS  -2.3  -0.9  -13.3*  3.7  -2.0  7.2*  -2966  2079  -5969 
  SAM  -1.9*  -1.7  -18.5*  2.4  0.0  3.1  -2628  -380  -10921* 
JCS  NP  -5.0*  -3.2*  5.9*  7.7*  2.2*  6.8*  -6634*  5261*  3284* 
(N = 577)  SCM  -2.9  -1.6  5.6*  2.6  -2.3  2.6  -3701  3012  2673 
  JSA  -2.5*  -1.9*  4.8*  2.5  -3.7*  -0.3  -3484*  1900  1444 
  ST  -2.6  -1.7  5.8*  3.4  -1.7  3.3  -3522  3077  2903 
  JRT  -2.0  -1.4  6.7*  2.2  -0.7  0.2  -3271  2328  2534 
  GT ≤ 9 Months  -2.3*  -1.7*  6.9*  2.0  0.3  1.3  -3345*  1546  2068 
  GT > 9 Months  -2.0  -0.9  8.4*  2.6  1.2*  -1.3  -1880  1762  4166 
  DC  1.8  1.0  12.3*  -2.5  1.5  -7.3  2365  -1102  5698 
  SAM  0.2  -0.2  -2.0  0.0  1.0  -1.8  417  -450  -1167 
SAM  NP  -8.6*  -5.2*  7.2*  11.0*  1.6*  8.1*  -11501*  7909*  3585 
(N = 430)  SCM  -7.3*  -3.9  6.0  8.0*  -2.5  2.9  -9711*  5585*  1626 
  JSA  -3.3*  -1.7*  9.0*  3.7*  -4.0*  1.9  -4846*  2773*  3553 
  ST  -5.6*  -3.6*  5.2  6.4*  -2.0  3.8  -7744*  5169*  2385 
  JRT  -3.2*  -2.5  10.7*  3.7  -1.4  4.4  -5583*  4058*  4654 
  GT ≤ 9 Months  -3.1*  -1.9*  10.6*  3.1  -1.5*  4.4*  -4921*  3555*  4967* 
  GT > 9 Months  -1.8  -1.2  12.2*  1.8  -0.6  1.8  -2820  1554  5112 
  DC  1.9*  0.7  17.4*  -2.6  0.2  -2.9  2370*  536  9954* 
  JCS  -0.8  -0.5  2.9  0.9  -1.5*  2.4  -1523  1828  2277 
Note:  Numbers in italics indicate significance on the 10% level, bold numbers on the 5% level, and * on the 1% level. 